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Abstract
Learning through experience facilitates optimization. We measure learning dynamics
using a panel with four million monthly credit card statements. We study add-on fees,
speciﬁcally cash advance, late payment, and over-limit fees. New credit card accounts
generate fee payments of over $16 per month. Through negative feedback — i.e. paying
a fee — consumers learn to avoid triggering future fees. Paying a fee last month reduces
the likelihood of paying a fee this month by about 40%. Controlling for account ﬁxed
eﬀects, monthly fee payments fall by 75% during the ﬁrst three years of account life.
We ﬁnd that learning is not monotonic. Knowledge depreciates about 10% per month,
implying that learning displays a strong recency eﬀect.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Economists believe that learning through experience underpins optimization and gener-
ates technological progress. Large literatures measure learning dynamics in the lab,1 and
in the ﬁeld.2
However, because of data limitations, relatively few papers measure learning in the
ﬁeld with micro-level (household) data. Among such household studies, most show that
households learn to optimize over time.3 Moreover, a few papers are able to identify the
speciﬁc mechanisms and information ﬂows that elicit learning. For instance, Fishman and
Pope (2006) study video stores, and ﬁnd that renters are more likely to return their videos
on time if they have recently been ﬁned for returning them late. Ho and Chong (2003) use
grocery store scanner data to estimate a model in which consumers learn about product
attributes. They ﬁnd that the model has greater predictive power, with fewer parameters,
than forecasting models used by retailers.4
The current paper studies the process by which individual households learn to avoid
add-on fees in the credit card market.5 We analyze a panel dataset that contains three
years of credit card statements, representing 120,000 consumers and 4,000,000 credit card
statements. We focus our analysis on credit card fees – late payment, over limit, and cash
1For example, Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990, 1991), McAllister (1991), Crawford (1995), Roth and
Erev (1995), VanHuyck, Battalio and Rankin (2001), Anderson (2000), Camerer (2003), and Wixted (2004a,
2004b).
2For example, see Zimmerman (1982), Argote, Beckman and Epple (1990), Gruber (1992), Bahk and Gort
(1993), Marimon and Sunder (1994), McAfee and McMillan (1996) , Nye (1996), Sargent (1999), Benkard
(2000), Thompson (2001), Thornton and Thompson (2001), Evans, Honkaphoja and Marimon (2001), Evans
and Honkaphoja (2001), and Barrios and Strobl (2004).
3For example, Miravete (2003) shows that consumers switch telephone calling plans to minimize monthly
bill payments even for very small diﬀerences in cost. Agarwal et al. (2005) report that 40 percent of
borrowers choose suboptimal interest rate contracts, but most eventually switch to cost-minimizing contracts.
4Lemieux and MacLeod (2000) study the eﬀect of an increase in unemployment beneﬁts in Canada. They
ﬁnd that the propensity to collect unemployment beneﬁts increased with a ﬁrst-time exposure to this new
system via an unemployment spell. Barber, Odean and Strahlevitz (2004) ﬁnd evidence that individual
investors tend to repurchase stocks that they previously sold for a gain.
5There is a large literature on the magnitude of interest payments and fees in the credit card market:
Ausubel (1991), Calem and Mester (1995), Massoud, Saunders and Scholnick (2006), Ausubel (1999), Kerr
and Dunn (2002), Shui and Ausubel (2004), DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004), Kerr (2004), Calem, Gordy
and Mester (2005).
2advance fees – since some observers argue that new customers do not optimally minimize
such fees.6 We want to know whether credit card holders improve with experience, learning
to avoid triggering fees.
We ﬁnd that fee payments are very large immediately after the opening of an account.
We ﬁnd that new accounts generate direct monthly fee payments that average $16 per
month.7 However, these payments fall by 75 percent during the ﬁrst four years of account
life. To formally study these dynamics, we estimate a learning model with the Method of
Simulated Moments. The data reveals that learning is driven by feedback. Making a late
payment — and consequently paying a fee — reduces the probability of another late payment
in the subsequent month by 44 percent.
These learning eﬀects may be driven by many diﬀerent channels. Consumers learn
about fees when they are forced to pay them. Alternatively, consumers may pay more
attention to their credit card account when they have recently paid fees. Whatever the
mechanism, card holders learn to sharply cut their fee payments over time.
We ﬁnd that the learning dynamics are not monotonic. Card holders act as if their
knowledge depreciates — their learning patterns exhibit a recency eﬀect.8 Al a t ep a y m e n t
charge from last month is more inﬂuential than an identical charge that was paid a year ago.
The monthly hazard rate of a fee payment increases as previous fee payments recede further
into the past (holding all else equal). We estimate an eﬀective knowledge depreciation rate of
6For example, Frontline reports that “The new billions in revenue reﬂect an age-old habit of human
behavior: Most people never anticipate they will pay late, so they do not shop around for better late fees.”
(http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/credit/more/rise.html) There is also a nascent academic
literature that studies how perfectly rational ﬁrms interact in equilibrium with imperfectly rational con-
sumers. See Shui and Ausubel (2004), DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004, 2006), Miao (2005), Mullainathan
and Shleifer (2005), Oster and Morton (2005), Gabaix and Laibson (2006), Heidhues and Koszegi (2006),
Jin and Leslie (2006), Koszegi and Rabin (2006), Spiegler (2006), and Ellison (forthcoming) for an overview.
7Moreover, this understates the impact of fees, since some behavior – e.g. a pair of late payments –
not only triggers direct fees but also triggers an interest rate increase, which is not captured in our $15
calculation. Suppose that a consumer is carrying $2,000 of debt. Changing the consumer’s interest rate
from 10% to 20% is equivalent to charging the consumer an extra $200. Late payments also may prompt
a report to the credit bureau, adversely aﬀecting the card holder’s credit accessability and creditworthness.
The average consumer has 4.8 cards and 2.7 actively used cards.
8See Lehrer (1988), Piccione and Rubinstein (1997) and Aumann, Hart and Perry (1997) for some theo-
retical models of forgetfulness.
3between 10 and 20 percent per month. At ﬁrst glance, this ﬁnding seems counter-intuitive.
But there are actually several examples of papers that have found such forgetting eﬀects.
For instance, Benkard (2000) ﬁnds evidence for both learning and forgetting — that is,
depreciation of productivity over time — in the manufacturing of aircraft, as do Argote,
Beckman and Epple (1990), in shipbuilding.
Our ﬁndings imply that learning is very powerful, but that depreciation partially oﬀsets
learning. Nevertheless the net eﬀect of learning is clear. Learning generates an overwhelm-
ing net reduction in fee payments.
The paper has the following organization. Section 2 summarizes our data and presents
our basic evidence for learning and backsliding. Section 3 presents a model for those pat-
terns. This model is estimated with the Method of Simulated Moments in section 4. Section
5 discusses alternative explanations for our ﬁndings. Section 6 concludes.
2T w o P a t t e r n s i n F e e P a y m e n t
In this section, we describe the dataset and present two sets of reduced-form analyses
of the data.
2.1 Data
We use a proprietary panel dataset from a large U.S. bank that issues credit cards na-
tionally. The dataset contains a representative random sample of about 128,000 credit card
accounts followed monthly over a 36 month period (from January 2002 through December
2004). The bulk of the data consists of the main billing information listed on each account’s
monthly statement, including total payment, spending, credit limit, balance, debt, purchase
and cash advance annual percentage rate (APR), and fees paid. At a quarterly frequency,
we observe each customer’s credit bureau rating (FICO score) and a proprietary (internal)
credit ‘behavior’ score. We have credit bureau data about the number of other credit cards
held by the account holder, total credit card balances, and mortgage balances. We have
data on the age, gender and income of the account holder, collected at the time of account
4opening. Further details on the data, including summary statistics and variable deﬁnitions,
are available in the data appendix.
We focus on three important types of fees, described below: late fees, over limit fees,
and cash advance fees.9
1. Late Fee: A late fee of $30 or $35 is assessed if the borrower makes a payment
beyond the due date on the credit card statement. If the borrower is late by more
than 60 days once, or by more than 30 days twice within a year, the bank may also
impose ‘penalty pricing’ by raising the APR to over 24 percent. The bank may also
choose to report late payment to credit bureaus, adversely aﬀecting consumers’ FICO
scores. If the borrower does not make a late payment during the six months after the
last late payment, the APR will revert to its normal (though not promotional) level.
2. Over Limit Fee: An over limit fee, also of $30 or $35, is assessed the ﬁrst time the
borrower exceeds his or her credit limit. The same penalty pricing as in the late fee
is imposed.
3. Cash Advance Fee: A cash advance fee of the greater of 3 percent of the amount
advanced, or $5, is levied for each cash advance on the credit card. Unlike the ﬁrst two
fees, this fee can be assessed many times per month. It does not cause the imposition
of penalty pricing on purchases or debt. However, the APR on cash advances is
typically greater than that on purchases, and is usually 16 percent or more.
9Other types of fees include annual, balance transfer, foreign transactions, and pay by phone. All
of these fees are relatively less important to both the bank and the borrower. Fewer issuers (the most
notable exception being American Express) continue to charge annual fees, largely as a result of increased
competition for new borrowers (Agarwal et al., 2005). The cards in our data do not have annual fees. A
balance transfer fee of 2-3% of the amount transferred is assessed on borrowers who shift debt from one card
to another. Since few consumers repeatedly transfer balances, borrower response to this fee will not allow
us to study learning about fee payment- though see Agarwal et al. (2006) for a discussion of other borrower
uses of balance transfer cards. The foreign transaction fees and pay by phone fees together comprise less
than three percent of the total fees collected by banks.
52.2 Reduced form analyses
2.2.1 Fee payment by account tenure
Figure 1 reports the frequency of each fee type as a function of account tenure. The
regression – like all those that follow – controls for time eﬀects, account ﬁxed eﬀects, and
time-varying account eﬀects. The data plotted in Figure 1 is generated by estimating,
f
j
i,t = α + φi + ψtime + Spline(Tenurei,t) (1)
+ η1Purchasei,t + η2Activei,t + η3BillExisti,t−1
+γ1Utili,t−1 +  i,t.
f
j
i,t is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if a fee of type j is paid by account i at
tenure t. Fee categories, j, include late payment fees – fLate
i,t – over limit fees – fOver
i,t –
and cash advance fees – fAdvance
i,t . Parameter α is a constant; φi is an account ﬁxed eﬀect;
ψtime is a time ﬁxed-eﬀect; Spline(Tenurei,t) is a spline10 that takes account tenure (time
since account was opened) as its argument; Purchasei,t is the total quantity of purchases in
the current month; Activei,t is a dummy variable that reﬂects the existence of any account
activity in the current month; BillExisti,t−1 is a dummy variable that reﬂects the existence
of a bill with a non-zero balance in the previous balance; Utili,t, for utilization, is debt
divided by the credit limit;  i,t is an error term. Table 1 provides mnemonics, deﬁnitions
and summary statistics for the independent variables used in our analyses.
Figure 1 plots the expected frequency of fees as a function of account tenure (holding the
other control variables ﬁxed at their means).11 This analysis shows that fee payments are
fairly common when accounts are initially opened, but that the frequency of fee payments
declines rapidly as account tenure increases. In the ﬁrst four years of account tenure, the
monthly frequency of cash advance fee payments drops from 57% of all accounts to 13%
10The spline has knots every 12 months through month 72.
11Tenure in all ﬁgures starts at month two since borrowers cannot, by deﬁnition, pay late or over limit
fees in the ﬁrst month their account is open.
6of all accounts. The frequency of late fee payments drops from 36% to 8%. Finally, the
frequency of over limit fee payments drops from 17% to 5%.12
Figures 2 reports the average value of each fee type as a function of account tenure.
The data plotted in Figure 2 is generated by estimating,
V
j
i,,t = α + φi + ψtime + Spline(Tenurei,t)
+ η1Purchasei,t + η2Activei,t + η3BillExisti,t−1
γ1Utili,t−1 +  i,t.
V
j
i,t is the value of fees of type j paid by account i at tenure t. All other variables are as
before.
Figure 2 shows that, when an account is opened, the card holder pays $6.65 per month
in cash advance fees, $5.63 per month in late fees, and $2.46 per month in over limit fees.
These numbers understate the total cost incurred by fee payments, as these numbers do
not include interest payments on the cash advances, the eﬀects of penalty pricing (i.e.
higher interest rates), or the adverse eﬀects of higher credit scores on other credit card fee
structures. As in Figure 1, Figure 2 shows that the average value of fee payments declines
rapidly with account tenure.
The conclusion from Figures 1 and 2 is fee usage drops strongly with experience. This
pattern is consistent with naive agent learning to use their credit card. We next turn on to
the second pattern.
2.2.2 The impact of past fee payment on current fee payment
Having paid fees in the past may aﬀect the current likelihood of paying a fee. Account
holders who have paid many fees may be less likely to pay current fees. Fees paid more
recently may have a smaller eﬀect on current fee payment than fees paid in the past. To
12We repeat the analysis controlling for behavior and FICO scores, both lagged by three months to reﬂect
the fact that they are only computed quarterly. We ﬁnd very similar patterns.
7summarize the possible impact, we calculate:
Lk =
E [ft | ft−k =1 ]
E [ft]
=
Probability of paying a fee given the agent paid a fee k periods ago
Probability of paying a fee
The interpretation is that a consumer who paid a fee k periods ago has probability of
paying a fee equal to the baseline probability in the current period multiplied by Lk.A
value of 1 for Lk indicates that having paid a fee k periods ago has no expect on the expected
probability of paying a fee this period; a value less than one indicates lagged fee payment
has reduced the probability, and a value greater than one indicates lagged fee payment has
increased the probability. For example, if Lk =0 .7, a consumer who paid a fee k periods
ago has a probability of paying a fee that is 30% below the baseline probability.
We report this ratio of conditional expectations averaged over all time periods t (note
that the ratio is already averaged over all account holders). We thus do not need to do
ﬁrst an estimation with controls, and then report the average eﬀects over the population —
we directly estimate the average eﬀect on the population. Among the advantages of this
formulation are that it avoids econometric problems associated with estimating probit or
logit models with ﬁxed eﬀects for a very large dataset; it avoids the ﬁxed-eﬀect biases in
dynamic models demonstrated by Nickell (1982), and it shows the possibility of learning
and backsliding in a transparent way.
Figure 3 plots Lk for all three types of fees for values of k from 1 to 35. All three
lines start below 1, indicating that recent fee payment reduces the probability of currently
paying a fee. For both cash advance and late fees, having paid a fee one month ago reduces
the probability of paying a fee in the current period by about 50 percent, while for over
l i m i tf e e s ,h a v ep a i ds u c haf e el a s tm o n t hr e duces the probability of paying a fee in the
current month by about half. However, the lines rapidly rise, indicating that as fee payment
recedes into the past, the eﬀect on current fee payment is reduced. By the time one year
8has passed, the eﬀect of past fee payment on current fee payment has almost disappeared.
Having paid an over limit fee only reduces the probability of paying such a fee currently by
about 7 percent. For cash advance fees, the reduction is 4 percent. For late fees, having
paid such a fee a year ago increases the probability of paying a fee currently by 7 percent.
Indeed, all three graphs asymptote to values above 1. While this might at ﬁrst glance
suggest that fee payment in the distant past increases the probability of currently paying
a fee, this number likely also reﬂects the eﬀects of averaging over individuals with diﬀerent
average propensities of fee payment. For instance, imagine that 10 percent of consumers
never pay fee (maybe because they don’t use their credit card), while the others have a long
run probability b of paying fees. Then, the long run Lk will be 1/0.9=1 .11.
In sum, the data show a second pattern in fee payment. People substantially reduce
their fee payments after paying a fee, consistent with fast learning, but they forget quickly.
Our ﬁndings imply that learning is very powerful, but that backsliding partially oﬀsets
learning. We next present a model for these two patterns.
3 A simple model of learning and backsliding
The previous section documented that fee payment declines over time, and past fee
payment reduces current fee payment, but with diminishing impact the longer ago fee
payment occurred. In this section we describe a simple learning model., which can also
be interpreted as a simple model of attention and inattention. This model includes three
components: a stock of feedback, a dynamic updating equation, and a mapping from the
stock of feedback to the next month’s fee payment.
Let Ft represent the eﬀective stock of Feedback. Let ft ∈ {0,1} represent the current
feedback. For simplicity, assume that experience is binary so that ft =0(if you are not
charged a fee at time t) and ft =1(if you are). The stock of feedback, Ft,i s :
(2) Ft = δtF0 + ψt+
t X
s=1
δt−sfs.
9In this dynamic updating equation, δ ∈ [0,1] represents the depreciation rate of the stock
of feedback. If δ =1 , there is no depreciation, and if δ =0 , there is full depreciation after
one period. We refer to this as “depreciation” but δ captures many related eﬀects including
recency bias, salience, forgetting, or any other form of temporal backsliding.13 The term
ψt means that, even the consumer receives no feedback, she still learns with the passage of
time, perhaps via word of mouth.
A consumer with stock of knowledge Ft will pay attention to the fees with probability
A(Ft), which we parametrize as:
(3) Probability of paying attention to the fee: A(Ft)=C + De−κFt
with κ,C,D ≥ 0, C + D ≤ 1. We view Eq. (3) as a representation of the psychology
of attention, or memory. This equation implies that events that have happened relatively
frequently are easier to remember.14 Also, after an extensive amount of learning, attention
saturates to C + D.I fC + D =1 , learning is perfect in the long run, but if C + D<1,
attention is imperfect even in the long run.
A consumer faces two mutually exclusive types of opportunities. With probability p00,
he can experience a need to pay a fee, for instance through ﬁnancial stress. If that does
not happen, he can just face an “avoidable opportunity” to pay a fee. If that opportunity
happens, he pays of a fee if and only if he was not paying attention to fees. Symbolically:
{ft+1 =1 } = {{Avoidable opportunity} and {Don’t pay attention}}or{Need}
Call p00 the probability of a need, p0 the probability of an avoidable opportunity, and Pt+1 =
Pt (ft+1 =1 ) , the probability of paying a fee at t +1 , given the history up to time t.W e
have:
Pt+1 = p0 (1 − A(Ft)) + p00
13Rubin and Wenzel (1996) oﬀer a comprehensive survey of the literature on forgetting.
14The same microfoundation applies to (??). Each memory system can remind the agent of the fees.
10and using the functional form (3), we get:
(4) Pt+1 = ae−βFt/a + b.
with a = p0D, β = aκ, b = p0C + p00.I t i s u s e f u l t o d e ﬁne φ = κψ, so the probability of
paying a fee at t +1is:
(5) Pt+1 = aexp
Ã
−φt −
β
a
t X
s=1
δt−sfs −
β
a
δtF0
!
+ b
Controlling for person ﬁxed eﬀects, the more fees you have paid in the past, the more
likely you are to avoid paying fees in the future: the ﬁrst-order eﬀect of a change in Ft on
Pt+1 is −β (when the Taylor expansion is taken around Ft =0 ). Parameter β captures
the strength of short-term learning. When β is large, past feedback reduces the expected
current rate of fee payment. Past fee payments drive down future fee payments through
a learning mechanism, like reinforcement (see for example Camerer 2003 and Sutton and
Barto 1998).
Under the above formulation, if the initial stock of knowledge F0 =0 , the initial propen-
sity to pay fees is a + b, while the long-run probability of a consumer who can pay perfect
attention is b.
4R e s u l t s
4.1 Estimating the learning model
We estimate the model described in the previous section by the method of simulated
moments (MSM). Deﬁne the vector of empirical moments–the Lk and tenure distribution
discussed above–as ¯ m. Given a parameter set θ, there is a theoretical moment set that we
denote m(θ). Since we cannot directly calculate m(θ),w ea p p r o x i m a t ei tw i t has i m u l a t o r ,
denoted ms(θ,Js),w h e r eJs is the number of observations used in the simulation for ms.
11Pakes and Pollard (1989) show that
ˆ θ =a r gm i n
θ
£
(ms(θ,Js) − ¯ m)W(ms(θ,Js) − ¯ m)0¤
,
is a consistent estimator for θ0,w h e r eW is an arbitrary positive deﬁnite weighting matrix.
Intuitively, ˆ θ is simply the parameter vector that minimizes the distance between the em-
pirical moments ¯ m and the outputs of the structural model ms(θ,Js). In order to calculate
t h ev a r i a n c eo fˆ θ,w en e e dt od e ﬁne a few more terms. Let Mθ ≡ ∂ms(θ,Js)/∂θ be the
numerically calculated derivative of the simulated moments with respect to the parameter
vector θ. We calculate the variance of ¯ m as
(6) ΩM ≡ Va r(ms(θ,Jm)),
where Jm is the number of observations from which ¯ m is calculated. Equation (6) deﬁnes
t h ev a r i a n c eo f¯ m under the assumption that the model is correct. With these deﬁnitions
in hand, following Pakes and Pollard (1989) and Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (2007),
we can calculate the variance of ˆ θ as,
Va r(ˆ θ)=
¡
M0
θWMθ
¢−1 M0
θW
£¡
1+Jm
Js
¢
ΩG
¤
WMθ
¡
M0
θWMθ
¢−1 .
We describe the simulation and optimization procedure in Appendix B.15
4.2 Estimation Results
Table 2 presents the MSM estimates for equation 5 for all three kinds of fees. The
ﬁrst row shows that rates of depreciation 1 − δ are quite substantial for all three fee types,
ranging from nearly 20 percent for the late fee to 8 percent for the cash advance fee. Thus,
the impact of paying a late fee a year ago has only about .811 ≈ .085 as much impact on
15U s i n gm e t h o do fs i m u l a t e dm o m e n t sa l s oa l l o w su st oa v o i dt h ed o w n w a r db i a si nd y n a m i cp a n e ld a t a
models with ﬁxed eﬀects. We have also tried estimating such models, and found, within the limits of the
bias, qualitatively similar results.
12the probability of paying a fee this month as having paid the same fee a month ago.
The second row provides estimates of β, which measures the rate of short-term learning.
Higher values of β imply that the stock of feedback has a larger impact on the probability
of paying a fee. Paying a fee this month reduces paying a fee next month by approximately
a fraction β.16
The third row provides estimates of φ, which parameterizes the eﬀect of the passage of
time on fee payment. The eﬀect on fee payment is small but present. For example, for the
late fee, an additional month’s time reduces fee probability by about 4%. The estimates
also imply that in the ﬁrst period, paying a fee once reduces the probability of learning by
β/(aφ)=2 1months.
The fourth through seventh rows give estimates for parameters a ,b and F0,w h i c hg o v e r n
the long- and short-run properties of fee probability and provide an estimate of the initial
stock of feedback. To allow for some of the heterogeneity in fee payment which may be
responsible for Lk asymptoting to values above 1 for large values of k,w el e tb take two
values, bL and bH for the population. The initial stock of feedback F0 is about equal to
one fee payment, on average, for all borrowers. For t =0 , the initial probability of paying
af e ei saexp
³
−
β
aδtF0
´
+ b. The model estimates this to be about 34 to 37 percent for
the late fee, about 10 to 12 percent for the over limit fee, and about 66 percent for the cash
advance fee. The long-run propensity to pay a fee b is generally low for all types and all
fees, ranging from 0 to 3 percent for the late fee, 0 to 2 percent for the over limit fee, and
about 2 percent for the cash advance fee
The six panels of Figure 4 plot the actual moments against the estimated moments, thus
giving some indication of goodness of ﬁt. The model ﬁts the tenure moments fairly closely
for the late fee, although it predicts a somewhat more rapid initial decline in fee payments
than seen in the data. The ﬁto ft h eLk is again good, although the model again predicts a
more rapid decline in the impact of past fee payments and has a smaller asymptotic value.
For the over limit fee, the estimated and actual moments nearly match for almost every
16As equation 5 shows, this is true when b is small, which is empirically the case.
13value of k for the Lk g r a p h . T h et e n u r em o m e n t sm a t c hs o m e w h a tm o r ec l o s e l yt h a ni nt h e
late fees case, although the model still shows a more rapid reduction in fee payment than
is seen in the data. The cash advance model ﬁts less well. Although the tenure moments
match to nearly the same degree as with the late fees, the Lk moments fail to match, with
the model showing a relatively ﬂat proﬁle of moments. This last result may indicate that
the determinants of cash advance fee payment are somewhat diﬀerent from the other fees.
This may not be surprising; paying cash advance fees is less clearly a mistake than paying
other kinds of fees, and may also be motivated by diﬀerent kinds of liquidity needs than
other kinds of fees (e.g. needing cash while traveling).
5 Discussion
5.1 Discussion of alternative explanations not based on learning
The patterns that we have observed could be driven by other factors.
Potential correlation between ﬁnancial distress and credit card tenure. The
tendency to observe declining fees may reﬂect a tendency for new account holders to ex-
perience more ﬁnancial/personal distress than account holders with high tenure. To test
this hypothesis, we determined if FICO scores (one inverse17 measure of ﬁnancial distress)
correlate with account tenure. We ﬁnd no such economically signiﬁcant relationship. We
predict FICO with an account-tenure spline using annual knots (controlling for account
and time ﬁxed eﬀects). The estimated tenure spline exhibits slopes that bounce around in
sign and are all very small in magnitude. For example, at a horizon of 5 years, the spline
predicts a total (accumulated) change in the FICO score of 18 units since the account was
opened. At a horizon 10 years the spline predicts a total (accumulated) change in the
FICO score of -0.04 units since the account was opened. Recall that the mean FICO score
is 732 and the standard deviation of the FICO score is 81. Hence, ﬁnancial distress does
17A high FICO score implies that the individual is a reliable creditor.
14not appear to meaningfully change with account tenure.
Potential correlation between purchasing patterns and credit card tenure.
The tendency to observe declining fees may reﬂect a tendency for new account holders
to spend more than account holders with high tenure. To test this hypothesis, we deter-
mined if purchases correlate with account tenure. We ﬁnd no such economically signiﬁcant
relationship. We predict Purchasewith an account-tenure spline using annual knots (con-
trolling for account and time ﬁxed eﬀects). The estimated tenure spline exhibits slopes that
bounce around in sign and are all very small in magnitude. Figure 5 plots the estimated
spline.
Non-utilization of the card. The fee dynamics that we observe could be driven by
consumers who temporarily or permanently stop using the card after paying a fee on that
card. We look for these eﬀects by estimating a regression model in which the outcome
of “no purchase in the current month” is predicted by dummies for past fee payments and
control variables including account and time ﬁxed eﬀects as well FICO, Behavior, and Util.
We ﬁnd very small eﬀects of past fee payments on subsequent card use. For example,
(controlling for account ﬁxed eﬀects) somebody who paid a fee every month for the past six
months is predicted to be only 2% less likely to use their card in the next month relative
to somebody with no fee payments in the last six months. Such very small eﬀects can not
explain our learning dynamics, which are over an order of magnitude larger.
Time-varying ﬁnancial service needs. Time varying ﬁnancial service needs may
also play an important role in driving service charge dynamics. To illustrate this idea, let
νt represent a time-varying cost of time, so that
(7) Pr(ft =1 )=νt.
where νt is an exogenous process, that causes fee use, but is not caused by it. To explain
our recency eﬀect, one needs νt to be negatively autocorrelated at a monthly frequency. To
15see this, consider the regression,
(8) ft = θft−1 + controls.
If (7) holds, then the regression coeﬃcient is θ = cov (νt,νt−1)/var(ft−1).
We run this regression, including all of our usual control variables: time- and account-
ﬁxed eﬀects, a tenure spline, Purchase, Active, BillExist,a n dUtil We also include
Behavior and FICO.18
f
j
i,t = θf
j
i,t−1 + α + φi + ψtime + Spline(Tenurei,t)
+ η1Purchasei,t + η2Activei,t + η3BillExisti,t−1
+ η4FICOi,t−3 + η5Behavei,t−3 + η6Utili,t +  i,t.
Results for the three types of fees are given in Table 3. We ﬁnd that θ is -0.75 for the late
fee, -0.52 for the over limit fee, and -0.28 for the cash advance fee. We call this the “recency
eﬀect,” since the payment of a fee last month greatly reduces the probability that a fee will
be paid this month.19
The empirical ﬁnding of θ<0 implies corr(νt,νt−1) < 0. Hence, to explain the “recency
eﬀect” with time-varying ﬁnancial needs, it would need to be the case that νt is negatively
autocorrelated. The autocorrelation of νt would need to be not only negative, but also
greater than 0.75 in absolute value: corr(νt,v t−1) ≤ θ = −0.75.20
We think that such a very strong negative autocorrelation of monthly needs is very
unlikely.21 First, since the regression results include time ﬁxed eﬀects, such autocorrelations
18The results do not diﬀer if we instead begin the regressions in month 2 and exclude the Behavior and
FICO scores.
19There is a potential small sample bias (Nickell 1981), to which we thank Peter Fishman for drawing our
attention. To see how large it is, we note that if ft is i.i.d., then in the regression ft = θft−1+constant, done
over a T periods, the expected value of θ is −1/T.W i t hT =2 4 , the bias is −0.05. We conclude that, in
our study, the small sample bias is very small compared to the large negative θ that we ﬁnd.
20It is easy to see that under (7), cov (ft,f t−1)=cov (νt,νt−1),a n dvar(ft)=E [νt](1− E [νt]) ≥
E

ν
2
t

− E [νt]
2 = var(νt),a sνt ∈ [0,1].S o , θ = cov(ft,f t−1)/var (ft−1) satisﬁes |θ| ≤
|cov (νt,νt−1)|/var (νt)=|corr(νt,νt−1)|,a n dθ and corr(νt,νt−1) have the same sign.
21The least implausible type of negatively autocorrelated process in economics is a “periodic spike” process,
16could not occur from events that happen at regular intervals during the year – e.g. from
summer vacations. Second, the presence of highly negative autocorrelations at a monthly
level would rule out events that last more than one month. For example, a personal
crisis that raised the opportunity cost of time for two months would create a positive
autocorrelation in time needs and fee payments over the two months, not a negative one.
Third, the time varying needs would have to produce higher than average fee payment in
one month followed by lower than average fee payment in the following month. This would
rule out episodes of high opportunity cost of time for one month followed by a return to
the status quo.
For most plausible processes, needs are likely to be positively autocorrelated. For ex-
ample, the available evidence implies that income processes are positively autocorrelated.
While we cannot rule out the “negatively autocorrelated needs” story, existing microeco-
nomic evidence suggests it is highly unlikely to be the right explanation for the empirical
patterns that we observe. We conclude that the ﬁnding of θ<0 in (8) is most plausibly
explained by a recency eﬀect — consumers become temporarily vigilant about fee avoidance
immediately after paying a fee.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Credit card users learn how to minimize add-on fees by paying them. With years of
experience, credit card customers substantially reduce their fee payments. We document
this process using a three-year panel dataset representing 120,000 accounts.
In our data, new accounts generate direct fee payments of $16 per month. The data
implies that negative feedback – i.e. paying fees – teaches consumers to avoid triggering
fees in the future. Controlling for account ﬁxed eﬀects, monthly fee payments fall by 75%
during the ﬁrst four years of account life.
which take a value of a every K periods, and b 6= a otherwise. It has an autocorrelation of −1/(K − 1).W e
fail to ﬁnd evidence for such a pattern in credit card use other than fees. For instance, expenses across time
are positively autocorrelated.
17We also ﬁnd that learning is not monotonic. In our basic speciﬁcation, we estimate
that knowledge depreciates 10% per month. As previous fee-paying lessons recede into the
past, consumers tend to backslide. However, on net, knowledge accumulation dominates
knowledge depreciation. Over time, fee-payments drastically fall.
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24Appendix A: Data Description
The total sample consists of 125,384 accounts open as of January 2002, and 22,392
opened between January and December of 2002, observed through December 2004. These
accounts were randomly sampled from several million accounts total held by the bank. From
this sample of 147,776, we drop accounts that were stolen, lost, or frozen (due to fraud).
We also exclude accounts that do not have any activity (purchases and payments) over the
entire period. This leaves 128,142 accounts. Finally, we also remove account observations
subsequent to default or bankruptcy, as borrowers do not have the opportunity to pay
fees in such instances. This leaves us with an unbalanced panel with 3.9 million account
observations.
Table A1 provides summary statistics for variables related to the accounts, including
account characteristics, card usage, fee payment, and account holder characteristics. The
second column notes whether the variable is observed monthly (‘M’), quarterly (‘Q’), or
at account origination (‘O’), the third column reports variable means, and the fourth col-
umn variable standard deviations. Note that the monthly averages for the ‘Fee Payment’
variables imply annual average total fees paid of $141 (=$11.75*12), with about 7.52 fee
payments per year. Higher interest payments induced by paying fees (which raise the
interest rate on purchases and cash advances) average about $226 per year.
The accounts also diﬀer by how long they have been open Over 31 percent of the
accounts are less than 12 months old, 20 percent are between 12 and 24 months old, 18
percent are between 24 and 36 months old, 13 percent are between 36 and 48 months old,
10 percent are between 48 and 60 months old, and 8 percent are more than 60 months old.
25Table A1: Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics
Description (Units) Freq. Mean Std. Dev.
Account Characteristics
Interest Rate on Purchases M 14.40 2.44
Interest Rate on Cash Advances (%) M 16.16 2.22
Credit Limit ($) M 8,205 3,385
Card Usage
Current Cash Advance ($) M 148 648
Payment ($) M 317 952
New Purchases ($) M 303 531
Debt on Last Statement ($) M 1,735 1,978
Minimum Payment Due ($) M 35 52
Utilization (Debt/Limit) (%) M 29 36
Fee Payment
Total Fees ($) M 10.10 14.82
Cash Advance Fee ($) M 5.09 11.29
Late Payment Fee ($) M 4.07 3.22
Over Limit Fee ($) M 1.23 1.57
Extra Interest Payments:
... Due to Over Limit or Late Fee ($) M 15.58 23.66
... Due to Cash Advances ($) M 3.25 3.92
Number of Times per month
... Cash Advance Fee Paid M 0.38 0.28
... Late Fee Paid M 0.14 0.21
... Over Limit Fee Paid M 0.08 0.10
Borrower Characteristics
FICO (Credit Bureau Risk) Score Q 731 76
Behavior Score Q 727 81
Number of Credit Cards O 4.84 3.56
Number of Active Cards O 2.69 2.34
Total Credit Card Balance ($) O 15,110 13,043
Mortgage Balance ($) O 47,968 84,617
26Notes: The “Credit Bureau Risk Score” is provided by Fair, Isaac and Company (hence ‘FICO’).
The greater the score, the less risky the consumer is. The “Payment Behavior Score” is a proprietary
score based on the consumer’s past payment history and debt burden, among other variables. It is
created by the bank to capture determinants of consumer payment behavior not accounted for by
the FICO score. “Q” indicates the variable is observed quarterly, “M” monthly, and “O” only at
account origination.
27Appendix B: Simulation and Optimization Procedure
The simulation procedure was created to match the data sample as closely as possible.
The data consists of approximately 120,000 accounts observed over 35 periods. Accounts
have tenure ranging from 1-72 months. In order to calculate the tenure moments, we
simulate a group of 120,000×36
72 agents over 59 periods.22
The Lk are estimated with a simulation of a separate sample of agents. Because the
estimated Lk vary depending on the distribution of tenure in the sample, we need to take
into account entry and exit from the sample population.23 In each period, N/36 agents
enter the simulation with tenure of 0 months, where N = JS × 36 is the total number of
observations.
G i v e nas e to fa g e n t se a c hw i t ht h e i ro w ns t o c ko fk n o w l e d g e ,t h es i m u l a t i o np r o c e e d s
as follows: ﬁrst, we calculate the probability of each agent paying a fee. Random numbers
are then drawn for each agent from a uniform distribution on the interval [0,1].I f a n
agent’s draw is less than her probability of a fee payment, then she is recorded as paying a
fee in this period. Next, a random 1 percent of the agents are removed from the sample,
corresponding to the rate of attrition observed in the data. Any agent with tenure of 72
months is also removed from the sample. In the ﬁnal step, we update each agent’s knowledge
stock according to whether or not she paid a fee, and we add a new set of N/36 agents
with zero tenure. The Lk simulation is run for 108 periods. The ﬁrst 72 generate a full
distribution of agents with tenure between 1 and 72 months. Periods 73-108 are the sample
from which the Lk are calculated. This calculation proceeds identically to that used on the
empirical data set.
The optimization procedure uses a combination of a grid search and a hill-climbing
algorithm. The ﬁrst stage employs a coarse grid that searches over a broad set of possible
22120,000*35 is the total number, N, of person*month observations. N*
59
72 is approximately the number
of these observations that are used in the regression sample to calculate the tenure moments from the data.
The group of people that is simulated over the 59 periods therefore numbers N/72.
23Since the change in an agent’s probability of paying a fee next period given this period is dependent on
her knowledge stock, and the magnitude of her knowledge stock is correlated with her tenure, her response
to a fee event will be correlated with her tenure.
28parameter values using a relatively low value of Js, for example, 40,000. The grid search is
split into a number of separate samples. Consider a grid consisting of A × B points. The
grid search calculates the value of the objective function at each point. In practice, this
is performed with multiple programs; for example, there could be A programs that each
calculate one 1×B column of grid points. The best point from each group is then saved. If
any of the top 5 points is on or near the edge of the grid, we expand the grid around that
point to ensure we ﬁnd the global maximum. In practice, more than 40 search programs
were used, generating 40+ candidate points from which to run the hill-climber.
The second stage of the optimization employs MATLAB’s fminsearch command, which
carries out the Nelder-Mead simplex method–the hill-climber. The optimization is run
until it converges to a point such that the estimated parameters do not change for at least
20 iterations. This generally requires at least 120 total iterations. Js was set to 180,000 to
insure that the point to which the algorithm converged was not an abnormally low value
due to measurement error.24
In order to calculate ΩM, we run the simulation 1000 times using JM agents at the
optimal ˆ θ and then calculate the variance-covariance matrix of the 1000 sets of simulated
moments. To calculate Mθ we perturb each parameter individually by ±1 percent. We
then calculate numerical derivatives for the moments with respect to the parameter vector,
creating, in the end, two 94×7 matrices of derivatives; one from the positive perturbations,
one from the negative perturbations. We choose the smaller of the two estimates of the
derivative for each component of the moment vector to insure that we have an upper bound
for Va r(ˆ θ).
24Intuitively, near the optimum, the objective function gets ﬂat. As the slope of the objective function
decreases, diﬀerences in its measured value are more likely to be due to simulation error than true variation.
29Table 1: Regression Variable Mnemonics and Summary Statistics
Mnemonic Description Mean Std. Dev.
fLate
i,t Dummy for Late Fee Payment at t 0.18 0.21
fOver
i,t Dummy for Over Limit Fee Payment at t 0.08 0.10
fAdvance
i,t Dummy for Cash Advance Fee Payment at t 0.38 0.28
FLate(δ)i,t−1 Net Times Late Fees Paid Through t − 1 1.58 0.94
FOver(δ)i,t−1 Net Times Over Limit Fees Paid Through t − 1 0.74 0.42
FAdvance(δ)i,t−1 Net Times Cash Advance Fees Paid Through t − 1 2.38 0.78
FICOi,t−3 FICO Score 727 81
Behavei,t−3 Behavior Score 731 76
Utili,t Utilization (Debt/Limit) 29 36
Purchasei,t Purchases ($) at t 303 531
Activei,t Dummy for Account Activity (Purchases) at t 0.86 0.19
BillExisti,t−1 Dummy for Existence of a Bill at t − 1 0.82 0.15
Notes: f
j
i,t denotes a payment of fee type j by account i at tenure t. Fj(δ)i,t−1 = f
j
i,t−1+(1−
δ)Fj(δ)i,t−2, i.e. the total number of fees of type j paid through tenure t−1, less those forgotten.
Means and standard deviations for these variables are computed for the (three) values of δ estimated
below in Table 3. FICOdenotes the credit bureau risk score provided by Fair, Isaac and Company,
lagged one quarter. The greater the score, the less risky the consumer is. The Behavior score is a
propriety number created by the bank to capture determinants of consumer payment behavior not
accounted for by the FICO score. Utilization is the ratio of current debt on the account to the
current credit limit. Purchases is the dollar amount of purchases on the account, while the dummy
variable for account activity is one if there were any purchases on the account. The bill existence
dummy is one if the consumer received a bill at tenure t − 1.
30Table 2: Model Estimation Results
Late Over Limit Cash Advance
δ 0.8007 0.9187 0.9060
(0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0002)
β 0.8547 0.9506 0.2157
(0.0041) (0.0067) (0.0007)
φ 0.0435 0.0452 0.0282
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0007)
a 0.9040 0.5438 0.8410
(0.0026) (0.0045) (0.0009)
bL 0.0000 0.0003 0.0213
(0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0001)
bH 0.0298 0.0198 0.0195
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
F0 1.0227 0.9746 1.0317
(0.0068) (0.0064) (0.0068)
Notes: This table presents MSM estimates of Pt (ft+1 =1 )=aexp
³
−φt −
β
a
Pt
s=1 δt−sfs −
β
aδtF0
´
+
b for each fee. We allow for two values of b, bL and bH to permit diﬀerent long-run propensities
to pay fees within the population. Details of the simulations are given in Appendix B. Standard
errors, in parentheses, are computed via Monte Carlo methods.
31Table 3: Time-Varying Needs
fLate
i,t fOver
i,t fAdvance
i,t
Intercept 0.2487* 0.1267** 0.4263**
(0.08236) (0.0284) (0.1547)
f
j
i,t−1 -0.7483** -0.5248** -0.2784**
(0.1403) (0.1076) (0.0640)
t< =1 2 -0.0103* -0.0077 -0.0237**
(0.0037) (0.0024) (0.0068)
12 <t< =2 4 -0.0059* -0.0025** -0.0127**
(0.0023) (0.0010) (0.0048)
24 <t< =3 6 -0.0044* -0.0004 -0.0057*
(0.0019) (0.0001) (0.0028)
36 <t< =4 8 -0.0021 -0.0001 -0.0021
(0.0015) (0.0001) (0.0018)
48 <t< =6 0 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0002
(0.0016) (0.0001) (0.0068)
60 <t -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0014) (0.0001) (0.0008)
Purchase/100i,t 0.0052 0.0021** 0.0073
(0.0034) (0.0003) (0.0053)
Activei,t 0.0071 0.0026** 0.0093
(0.0048) (0.0009) (0.0058)
BillExisti,t−1 0.0618** 0.0179* 0.0964**
(0.0257) (0.0084) (0.0389)
Behavei,t−3 -0.0035** -0.0028** -0.0053*
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0025)
FICO i,t−3 -0.0027** -0.0014** -0.0046*
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0021)
Utili,t 0.0506** 0.0283** 0.0693**
(0.0074) (0.008) (0.0182)
Adjusted R-squared 0.0416 0.0484 0.0497
No. of Obs. 3.9 million 3.9 million 3.9 million
32Notes: This table reports the results of estimating f
j
i,t = α + φi + ψtime + θf
j
i,t−1 +
Spline(Tenurei,t)+η1Purchasei,t+η2Activei,t+η3BillExisti,t−1+η4FICOi,t−3+η5Behavei,t−3+
η6Utili,t+ i,t,w h e r et h eﬁrst three terms are a constant, and account- and time- ﬁxed eﬀects. Rows
3 through 8 report the coeﬃcients on the spline for account tenure (where the spline has yearly knot
points). Variable deﬁnitions are as in table 1. Huber/White/Sandwich standard errors are in paren-
theses.
* denotes statistical signiﬁcance at a 95 percent conﬁdence level, and ** denotes statistical
signiﬁcance at a 99 percent conﬁdence level.
33Figure 1: Fee Frequency and Account Tenure
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Notes:  This figure plots the fitted values of regressions of fee frequency (times per month fees are paid) on a continuous piecewise linear function of account tenure (the function is a spline, with knots 
every twelve months, on the time since the account was opened), a constant, account- and time-fixed effects, and control variables (utilization (debit/limit), purchase amount, and dummy variables for 
any account activity this month and the existence of a bill last month).  The intercept is computed by summing the constant with the product of the estimated coefficients on the control variables and 
their average values (the account and time-fixed effects sum to zero by construction).  Tenure starts at the second month because account holders are, by definition, unable to pay late or over limit  fees 
in their first month of account tenure. Figure 2: Fee Value and Account Tenure
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Notes:  This figure plots the fitted values of regressions of fee value (dollars per month in fees paid) on a continuous piecewise linear function of account tenure (the function is a spline, with knots every 
twelve months, on the time since the account was opened), a constant, account- and time-fixed effects, and control variables (utilization (debit/limit), purchase amount, and dummy variables for any 
account activity this month and the existence of a bill last month).  The intercept is computed by summing the constant with the product of the estimated coefficients on the control variables and their 
average values (the account and time-fixed effects sum to zero by construction).  Tenure starts at the second month because account holders are, by definition, unable to pay late or over limit  fees in 
their first month of account tenure. Figure 3: Impact of Fees Paid k Months Ago on Fees Paid Now
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Notes:  This figure plots Lk=E(ft|ft-k=1)/E(ft), the ratio of the conditional mean of fees ft paid now given a fee was paid k months ago to the mean of fees paid now.  If this value is 1, having paid a fee k 
months ago has no effect on current fee payment; if it is less than one, having paid a fee k months ago reduces current fee payment; if it is greater than one, it increases fee payment. 
 
Figure 4: Actual and Predicted Moments for Tenure and Lk 
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Figure 5: Purchases and Account Tenure
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Notes:  This figure plots the fitted values of a regression of monthly purchases (in dollars) on a continuous piecewise linear function of account tenure (the 
function is a spline, with knots every twelve months, on the time since the account was opened), a constant, account- and time- fixed effects, and control 
variables (FICO score, Behavior Score and Utilization (Debt/Limit)).  The intercept is computed by summing the constant with the product of the estimated 
coefficients on the control variables and their average values (the account- and time- fixed effects sum to zero by construction).  Tenure starts at the fourth month 
because the FICO and Behavior scores, available only quarterly from account opening, are lagged three months in the regressions. 